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THE POPULARIZATION OF LAW

Huntington Cairns*
THE REQUIREMENTS OF POPULARIZATION

L

AW has been a major interest of the Western, and particularly the
European, mind. Like physics it has provided a subject matter
upon which many of the resources of the human intellect may be
tested. It has yielded to many methods and, as a specialty with a circumscribed body of material, it has demanded the formulation of clear
ideas so that interconnections are manifest and irrelevancies eliminated.
Its great reward is the bestowal of the sense for style, which Whitehead has termed the ultimate morality of mind, and which is the
product of specialization alone.
These reflections are directed at law as a science or the object of a
purely speculative inquiry, a position which it assumed in Greek thought
and has held until recent times. With the rise of the universities in the
Middle Ages, law acquired an additional but separate function: it became professionalized. That is to say, from the twelfth century onwards the lawyer, unlike his predecessor in the Greek and Roman
worlds, acquired through long study special techniques which were
utilized for social, as distinguished from intellectual, ends. His activities were guided in the main by theoretical analysis rather than by the
trial and error method of previous days. In England the common law
was not taught at the universities but it began to be professionalized
about the time of Edward I.1 It became also an essential weapon for
the protection of possessions as the Paston Letters of the fifteenth
century show, and the men and women of that time found it necessary
to acquire a sound mastery of it. The Duke of Norfolk always coveted
the manor of Caister and the Duke of Suffolk that of Drayton, and
other noblemen were equally greedy. "I grete yow wel, and avyse yow
to thynkk onis of the daie of youre fadris counseyle to lerne the lawe,"
Agnes Paston wrote her son Edmund in 1445, "for he seyde maine
tymis that ho so ever schulde dwelle at Paston, schulde have nede to

* Assistant General Counsel, United States Treasury Department; LL.B., University of Maryland; author, LAw AND THE SocIAL ScIENCES (1935), TAX LAws OF
MARYLAND (1937), THE THEORY OF LEGAL ScIENCE (1941), and articles in various
legal periodicals.-Ed.
1 On the professions generally, see CARR-SAUNDERS and WILSON, THE PROFESSIONS 284 (1933); WHITEHEAD, ADVENTURES OF lnEAs 72 (1933).
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conne defende hym selfe." 2 In the same century in Scotland the Fifth
Parliament of James the Fourth ordained that law should be taught in
the Grammar Schools to the sons of barons and freeholders so that
justice might remain universally through the realm. But by Blackstone's time in England law was no longer part of the cultural equipment of an educated man. A hundred years later, in spite of Blackstone,
Maine 8 pointed out that ''We in Great Britain and Ireland are altogether singular in our tacit conviction that law belongs as much to the
class of exclusively professional subjects as the practice of anatomy."
He contrasted this condition with that which obtained in France, Switzerland and Germany, where he observed that the average citizen had
a fair practical knowledge of the law which regulated his everyday life.
In the Anglo-American world both the science of law and the profession of law are in the realm of the esoteric. Law is no longer in the
main stream of speculative inquiry as it was from the time of Plato
to that of Hegel; as a profession its techniques necessarily may be
learned only after a long and arduous apprenticeship. It has disappeared, along with grammar, rhetoric and philosophy, as a branch of
learning necessary for the education of a cultured man.
There have been many attempts, however, by the profession to
popularize a knowledge of law; there is also an effort today on the part
of two or three philosophers to reincorporate law in the domain of
philosophy. The requirements of successful popularization are no
more than some of the requirements of good writing in general: namely,
the possession of what is termed the synoptic mind, or the ability to
see one's subject as a whole and in perspective, and the gift of intelligibility. The first question to be answered in the latter sphere is
at what level shall the subject matter be made intelligible. Legal
popularization is without the aid of two characteristics that mark
the current attempts to popularize science: novelty and intellectual
gratification. Although the information contained in legal guides
may be new to the layman, it does not possess the element of strangeness which accompanies the modern accounts of the world which
the new physics has revealed to us. Nor do the legal guides provide a
sufficient amount of problem material to stimulate the intelligent reader
or to gratify his impulse to follow an argument of some rigorousness.
2
2 THE PASTON LETTERS, Gairdner ed., 72, No. 62 (1904). Gairdner states
that "the Paston letters afford ample evidence that every man who had property to
protect, if not every well-educated woman also, was perfectly well versed in the
ordinary form of legal processes." 1 id. 118.
8
V1LLAGE-COMMUNITIES IN THE EAST AND WEST, 7th ed., 59 (1895).
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The introductions to legal thinking which attempt to meet this need 4
give the impression that legal processes are more arbitrary than logical,
which is indeed the case; it is well to recognize that the reader to that
extent is deprived of a stimulus to interest.
Thif Mysterious Science of the Law

Mr. Boorstin's 5 volume is a study of the most successful popularization of the law ever written, Blackstone's Commentaries on the
Laws of England. Anticipating Maine, Blackstone 6 observed that the
laws and constitution of England constituted "a species of knowledge,
in which the gentlemen of England have been more remarkably deficient than those of all Europe besides." His inaugural lecture was
devoted in part to an establishment of the proposition that "a compe~ ~~~cl~~ c l ~ ~cy in~~~~~~
proper accomplishment of every gentleman and scholar." 7 He examined the requirements of each social class and showed the benefits
which would result if they possessed a knowledge of English law. He
kept the intelligent reader resolutely before him in his exposition of the
law and his success with him was immediate and continuing. He was
read by the intellectuals-Hume, Johnson, Goldsmith, Burke, Adam
Smith and Godwin; Gibbon went through the Commentaries three
times. He was studied by the nobilicy and the squirearchy. A generation
or two later, knowledge of the Commentaries was so widespread that
Punch could satirize it in Gilbert A. A. Beckett's serial The Comic
Blackstone. The Commentaries survive today in both the literary and
the legal traditions. Its nearest rival in general popularicy is Maine's
Ancient Law and like that work it is a model of exposition. Both
authors had a predilection in Maine's words for "lucid.icy, simplicicy and
system" and while Maine's prose is more powerful, the literary qualicy of Blackstone is of high order. Its importance as a statement of the
main body of English law at a turning point in its history appears to
be increasing rather than diminishing.
The object of Mr. Boorstin's study is to analyze Blackstone's use
of reason in his exposition of English law. Mr. Boorstin is under the
impression that because of
4

E.g., LuNT, THE RoAD TO THE LAW (1932); MORTENSON, You BE THE
(1940).

JUDGE
5

THE MYSTERIOUS ScIENCE OF THE LAw. By Daniel J. Boorstin. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press. 1941. Pp. xviii, 275. $3.
6
l BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *4 (1756).
7

Id. *5-6.
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" ... the ideas of Comte, Darwin, Marx, Freud, and Veblen, we come
to minimize the importance of 'reason' in determining the course
of history. According to these ideas, 'reason' ceases to be the power
holding in check the dark forces of superstition, self-interest, and
unreason, and instead rational systems become themselves the
expression of dark and uncontrollable forces. In the vocabulary of
intellectual history 'reason' has been gradually displaced by 'rationalization.' " 8
His purpose therefore is to show the extent to which Blackstone was
influenced by the beliefs of his time and the lengths to which he went
as an apologist of eighteenth century values. His method of approach
to the Commentaries is useful and falls into three divisions: Blackstone's attitude towards "Nature" or the materials of experience; his
use of "Reason"; and the system of "Values" which he defends.
It is at once apparent that Mr. Boorstin, like his great predecessor
Blackstone, has not escaped from the philosophic tendencies of his age.
He is as severely antirationalistic as Blackstone was purportedly rationalistic. His deliberate adoption of a popular form of psychoanalysis 9
to explain the historical process is as naive as anything that may be
adduced in Blackstone. The psychoanalytic application of the idea of
rationalization to the historical process is merely a late extension of
the nineteenth century reaction against extreme expressions of rationalism. But in its refusal to assign any place to reason in accounting for
human behavior, and in its attempt to explain all human achievements
as the product of "dark and uncontrollable forces" its position is no less
absurd than that which it is combating. Rationalism was as much a
factor in the elimination of the belief in witchcraft as any other force.
There are, of course, implicit assumptions and unperceived mental
traits operating in all thinkers, and it is part of the business of criticism
to lay them bare. They influence thinking, and if asserted as independent propositions, they no doubt are frequently of an extremely
dubious character. Nevertheless, it is possible to reach (and frequently
we do reach) valid results on the basis of false premises. It is well to
have the false premises set forth clearly before us; but our main efforts
should be directed at the validity of the product and the extent to
8

BooRSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS ScIENCE OF THE LAw 5 (1941).
The notion of "rationalization" was first put forward by Ernest Jones, a
disciple of Freud. See JoNEs, PAPERS ON PsYcHo-ANALYSis, 2d ed., 8 (1918). In
psychoanalytic literature it is defined as a process which arises out of the need for
accounting or justifying to the self for certain feelings, ideas, or behavior. Mr. Boorstin does not make out a case that Blackstone felt any such need on his own behalf. On
the whole, he was quite satisfied with English law.
9
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which, if any, its invalidity may be traced to the implicit assumptions
and mental habits of its creator.
In his view of nature, his worship of reason, and his adherence to
certain values, Blackstone, as Mr. Boorstin shows, followed the dominant beliefs of his time. Since he was in no sense a philosopher, had
_reached no dominant views by his own analysis, and was not pre-eminently endowed with a critical spirit, this is not surprising. At this late
date, it would have been astonishing to learn that Blackstone was on
one of the minority sides represented by Berkeley or Rousseau. Mr.
Boorstin shows that Blackstone, in his attitude towards his materials,
assumed that English law could be systemized and reduced to principles; and that, furthermore, the law itself contained such principles.
He thought also that there must be an intelligible reason behind all
legal rules and practices.
Mr. Boorstin concludes that "Blackstone was, in a sense, doing for
the English legal system what Newton had done for the physical
world, and what Locke had done for the world of the mind." 10 He
shows that Blackstone also entertained various other eighteenth century views on the nature of man, the uses of comparative law, and the
existence of an earlier golden age. In Blackstone's attitude towards
reason, Mr. Boorstin maintains that Blackstone was a common-sense
philosopher and that he employed the legal maxim as a device to indicate that a particular rule had its justification in common sense and
not in philosophy. Mr. Boorstin's argument is that since Locke was
the dominant philosopher of the eighteenth century, Blackstone must
have been a common-sense philosopher; but he cites nothing from
Blackstone which clearly establishes the point. In the realm of values,
Mr. Boorstin discusses Blackstone's attitude towards the notions of
"humanity," "liberty," and "property." Here he once again assumes
that because certain beliefs were held by other prominent figures they
must necessarily have been held by Blackstone.
Mr. Boorstin has a strong tendency to overstate his case, and his
assertions on Blackstone's various positions should be regarded with
caution. Thus, in an attempt to establish that Blackstone's "study of the
law was just another voyage in the quest for 'man in general,'" he
states:
" ... he might not inappropriately have described his study, in the
manner in which Adam Smith was later to define ,his own, as 'An
Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Laws of Nations, Illus10 BooRSTIN, THE MYSTER1ous Sc1ENCE OF THE LAw 12 (1941).
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trated from the Laws of England.' For this main enterprise the
particular laws of England were little more than examples. True,
one should have 'an accurate knowledge of our own municipal
constitutions,' but the center of interest was to be in 'their original,
reason, and history.' And even more important than these in
Blackstone's treatment of the law were 'the general spirit of laws
and principles of universal jurisprudence.' The laws of England
were for Blackstone a body for studying the anatomy of laws in
general." 11
The quotations from Blackstone are cited to the preface, an inspection
of which yields the following sentence, which does not support Mr.
Boorstin's interpretation when fairly construed:
". . . all, who of late years have attended the public administration of justice, must be sensible that a masterly acquaintance with
the general spirit of laws and principles of universal jurisprudence,
combined with an accurate knowledge of our own municipal constitutions, their original, reason, and history, hath given a beauty
and energy to many modern judicial decisions, with which our
ancestors were wholly unacquainted." 12
Taking Mr. Boorstin's book as a whole, however, it may be said
that he has made out his case. That is to say, Blackstone in the writing
of the Commentaries gave expression to certain notions which were
widely held in the third quarter of the eighteenth century. Mr. Boorstin, however, is chiefly impressed by their quaintness, and he makes no
effort to ascertain their effect upon Blackstone's main enterprise-the
attempt to present the whole of English law in an intelligible form.
Did those curious beliefs, those methods of the periwig and furbelow,
interfere with or distort Blackstone's chief objective? There is no evidence that they did or that at the worst they are anything more than
harmless error. In the main, they are the ornaments of eighteenth
century writing, the elegancies which appealed to the eighteenth century
English gentleman. Some of those practices have exasperated later
editors. Thus, his earnest solicitude to find a reason for every rule has
not heretofore passed unnoticed. Blackstone asserted "that, on the
taking of a whale on the coast, which is a royal fish, it shall be divided
between the king and queen; the head only being the king's property,
and the tail of it the queen's. . .. The reason of this whimsical division,
assigned by our ancient records, was to furnish the queen's wardrobe
11

Id. 35.

12 I

BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES,

author's preface (1756).
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with whalebone." 18 Later editors have not failed to comment on the
"whimsicality," for the whalebone lies entirely in the head of the
royal fish. Again, when he wrote that "The husband also, by the old
law, might give his wife moderate correction. • .. But with us, in the
politer reign of Charles the Second, this power of correction began to
be doubted; and a wife may now have security of the peace against
her husband.•.. Yet the lower rank of people, who were always fond
of the old common law, still claim and exert their ancient privilege," 14
Dicey commented that "the boldness is far more obvious than the
wisdom of an apology which suggests that a costermonger who smashes
his wife's nose is inspired with enthusiasm for the common law." 15 In
both of these examples,- of course, Blackstone may be indulging in the
lecturer's privilege of entertaining his listeners with a little humor.
Because a work before us is a classic, it is not necessary to assume that
it is totally lacking in that quality. None of this, however, goes to
Blackstone's capacities as an interpreter of the law, to his great merits as
evidenced in his discussion of the general issue plea,16 or to his defects,
as in his attempts to account for the doctrine of employer's liability.17
When we pass beyond the merely quaint to a deeper level, it is
far from certain that Mr. Boorstin has established some of his influences.
There is much talk of the importance of Newton, but that Newton
exercised any significant influence direct or indirect on Blackstone, or
that Blackstone even understood or was interested in his achievements,
is not shown. Bentham, who was directly influenced by Newton, and
who was Blackstone's most relentless critic, praised Blackstone for the
very qualities which distinguished him from Newton. Bentham sought
in the moral world for the equivalent of the Newtonian physical laws;
and he believed that he had discovered them in the principle of utility
and the principle of the association of ideas. Those two principles were
held to perform in morals the function that the principle of mutual attraction performed in physics. No comparable idea ever occurred to
Blackstone. As Bentham saw, Blackstone had adopted the method of
exposition; his task was to explain law as it was; Bentham's own approach was normative, and since his object was to state the law that
13

Id. *222 (1756).
Id. *444-445.
15 "Blackstone's Commentaries," 4 CAMBRIDGE L. J. 286 at 292 (1932). If it is
assumed that Blackstone was influenced by those who held views similar to his, it is
necessary to begin with Socrates, who maintained that knowledge always implied the
ability to render a reason. PLATo, PHAEDo OF SocRATES 76 B.
16 3 BLACKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES *305 et seq. (1756).
17
1 id. *429 et seq.
14
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ought to be, Bentham needed principles to guide his inquiries.18 Blackstone's method required him to solve the problem of arrangement, and
in that Bentham thought Blackstone excelled and had accomplished
more and better than was ever done before by anyone. " 'Tis to him we
owe such an arrangement of the elements of Jurisprudence," 19 he
wrote, "as wants little, perhaps, of being the best that a technical
nomenclature will admit of." Bentham was distinguishing the exposition of an existing body of legal material-a "technical" arrangement
that was a "sink" which would with equal facility "swallow any garbage that is thrown into it"-from the "natural" method applicable
to the social sciences which is based on the principles of human nature.20
Blackstone, in short, was teaching, and such rationality as his arrangement or principles exhibited or as he put forward was merely lawyer's
reasoning, i.e., "such as none but a lawyer gives, nor any but a lawyer
would put up with"; Bentham's rationality, however, was such that
"any man might see the force of [it] as well as he." 21 Bentham's
distinction is a sound one and much closer to the point than the easy
assumption that Blackstone, because he lived in a Newtonian period,
aimed at an exposition based on Newtonian principles.
It would appear that the popularity of the Commentaries was due
to the fact that Blackstone accomplished his objective: he gave a full
exposition of English law in an intelligible manner. To no other source
could the profession or the layman turn at the time for what Blackstone provided in such a reasonable compass. That he gave expression
to the thought of his time, to the extent Mr. Boorstin reveals, no doubt
contributed to the palatableness of the volume; but the novelty of the
enterprise, and above all, the success with which Blackstone carried it
off, were no less factors in the popular recognition it achieved.

The Quest for Law

In Mr. Seagle's volume 22 we have the latest attempt to write an
"introductory book on law" at a level which will appeal to the layman.
His method is that of the general historian but restricted to the form
of an "historical typology upon an ideological basis." 28 That is to say,
18 l

BOWRING, WORKS OF BENTHAM

229 (1843).

Id. 237.
20 Id.
21Id. 238.

19

22 THE QuEST FOR

1941. Pp. xv, 439. $5.
28 Id. xiii.

I.Aw.

By

William Seagle. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.
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he has written a general legal history, but he has employed the sampling method rather than a strict chronology. He classifies the types
of law into three groups, the primitive, archaic, and mature. By primitive law, he means the law of the preliterate people who have not yet
developed courts but who nevertheless possess rules of conduct and
other means of handling social confficts. Archaic law is defined as the
stage of court organization and officialdom, and mature law as the
period of professionalization, the stage at which the professional lawyer dominates legal activity. His fundamental effort is "to sketch the
growth of law from the point of view of increasing complexity." 24
Mr. Seagle's precise task has not before been attempted in English,
and there is therefore room for his volume in the sense that it is not a
duplication of pre-existing work. He did not, however, keep his objective before him, with the result that he has written two books. He
has put forward a popular history of law, and at the same time he has
indulged throughout in what Hilaire Belloc has termed "writing to the
third power," which is to say, criticism of criticism of criticism. The
intrusion of the criticism upon the popularization can only serve to
bewilder the layman, but it increases the interest of the book for the
legal profession, or rather that small part of the profession which follows jurisprudential controversy.
As a popularization of the law, and considered solely in that aspect,
Mr. Seagle's volume is. certainly one of the most useful now on the
market. It gives as wide a perspective of the legal process as could
reasonably be expected within its compass, and it is substantial enough
to hold the interest of the reader who finds satisfaction in following a
not too intricate argument. The material is clearly arranged and is
treated from the point of view of society generally. The reader is
thus presented with an account of law much broader than the typical
treatment based solely on the Anglo-American tradition. In general,
the discussion is in analytical-historical terms, and most of the important ideas which have occupied jurists· since the days of Plato are
given presentation, and usually with the concrete human case in sight.
There is a warm imagination present throughout the book which generally translates abstract legal doctrine into situations involving living
human beings. One of the most attractive qualities of the volume is
its full supply of humor.
Its "chief defect, aside from the third power writing noted above,
is that it employs too many technical terms even for the intelligent lay24

Id.
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man. I open the book at random to the following paragraph on page
171:
"In the Anglo-Saxon period the law of England was archaic,
dealt with blood-feud and composition, and knew compurgation
and other archaic modes of trial. The laws of the Anglo-Saxon
kings are typically archaic codes, and in this sense the history of
common law, 'begins' with a code. There are no Twelve Tables
marking fundamental procedural and political changes, but there
are great statutes of this character in the formative period of the
common law which was in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.
The Assize of Clarendon of 1166, and the Statute of Westminster
the Second of 12 85 were of enormous importance in shaping procedure; 41 the famous provision of the latter statute, called de
donis conditionalibus, as well as the statute Quia Emptores of
42
1290, was vital in preserving the feudal land law. The term
'assize,' which is frequently encountered in English law-books,
means a session or sitting and came to be applied to royal resolves
or decrees, and it is thus only another term for a statute."
Mr. Seagle apparently realized that the reader would feel the need for
further clarification and footnotes 41 and 42 were thus inserted (in the
back of the volume where all the footnotes are collected) to provide
additional instruction:
41

The Assize of Clarendon was of particular importance in
shaping criminal procedure, including the grand jury. The Statute
of Westminster the Second, which was in fifty chapters, was virtually a mediaeval code book. One of its most important provisions was in the famous chapter 24, which, by permitting the
chancery to frame new writs in analogous cases, created a method
for developing the common law.
2
" ' De Donis, which was the first chapter of the Statute of
Westminster the Second, was aimed at the alienation of entailed
estates; the statute of Quia Emptores was aimed at the defeat of
the incidents of feudal tenure, such as wardship, marriage, relief,
and escheat, by means of progressive sub-infeudation."
"

The quoted paragraph, together with the footnotes, have been submitted to four intelligent laymen and one lawyer. They understood the
paragraph as a whole to mean that the common law took its beginning
in a code and that, by later statutory enactment, important procedural
changes were introduced. Mr. Seagle was thus quite successful in conveying his main point. None of them, however, were able to state the
function of De Donis or Quia Emptores otherwise than in the language

57°
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of the text, which they confessed was meaningless; nor did resort on
their part to the latest edition of Merriam's Webster for the definition
of "subinfeudation" result in anything helpful. The same test with
Blackstone's 25 account of Quia Emptores brought understanding. No
doubt Mr. Seagle's paragraph can be matched.by similar parapraghs in
Blackstone ( though a quick search has not turned up any), but it is a
safe assertion that none can be turned up in the great rival of the Commentaries for popularity, Maine's Ancient Law. Maine's intelligibility
is a model to which popularizers cannot devote too much attention. The
use of technical terms, which has long been a source of the layman's
traditional hostility towards the law, was reduced by Maine to a minimum and then employed only after clear definition.
That part of Mr. Seagle's text which represents his own contribution to legal thought is important and should have been reserved for
· a separate volume. Since that contribution is interlarded throughout
the text, there is no presentation of a general theory except that described in the basic outline, which is certainly a questionable one. The
theory that law falls into three stages, primitive, archaic and mature,
representing a movement from simplicity to complexity, is well enough
to bind the volume together-although if it had been omitted the
volume would have lost no unity-but as a theory of society· it is a
refinement of one of the evolutionary doctrines and is difficult to
reconcile with the known facts of the social structure. Mr. Seagle is not
insisting upon a unilinear or rectilinear order of development; in fact,
he expressly, and quite soundly, repudiates any such notion. He is
merely observing that society as it has been constituted in the past seems
to fall into three groups, and he has searched for the differentia of
those groups. Assuming that his system is not entirely arbitrary, can
we accept his notion that "primitive" law is marked off from "archaic"
law by the "court" in the face of Llewellyn's and Hoebel's 26 description
( and that of previous writers) of Cheyenne law, which shows the
functioning in that culture of "courts" or their equivalent? Since the
Cheyenne possessed "courts," Mr. Seagle's system requires their law to
be classified as "archaic."
If Mr. Seagle is going to adopt a morphological approach, it must
consist of many more parts than the one he has devised if it is intended
faithfully to reflect the various societies which are known to have ex25

2 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *91 (1756).
26 THE CHEYENNE WAY 136 and passim (1941).

Mr. Seagle is careful not to
employ the word "stages" but his idea of a movement from simplicity to complexity is
strictly in accordance with the traditional doctrine of stages.
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isted. The assumption, for example, that all primitive societies can be
grouped at one level is a dangerous one and does not correspond to the
facts. We might ask further: What does his morphology reveal to us
which is not otherwise apparent? We know that some societies have not
had courts, and that in some which have possessed courts, law has not
been professionalized, and that where there has been professionalization
there have always been courts. On those facts, Mr. Seagle has constructed his grouping of societies and has assigned to each a form of
law. But as he has defined "law" ("law is a mode of regulating conduct by means of sanctions imposed by politically organized society" 21 )
in neither its nature nor its function does it exhibit any differences in the
three groupings. In Mr. Seagle's theory there are not three kinds of
"law" corresponding to his morphology; there is only one "law" and
that is found in all stages. It is not apparent, therefore, what purpose
his morphology serves. In a purely historical approach, the notions of
"court" and "professionalism" as distinguishing characteristics of some
legal systems may be of significance in leading to new insights, but
they do not embrace enough to be the basis of Mr. Seagle's morphology.
Nor does Mr. Seagle's introduction of the idea of "complexity" help
matters. What can "complexity" possibly mean in objective sense when
it is asserted that the Greek procedure is simpler than that which prevails today? Should not the whole notion of "complexity," which has
proved a fruitless legacy of Spencerian thinking, be thrown out?
Another trait to which Mr. Seagle gives full vent is the indulgence
in hypothetical reconstructions of matters of prehistory, apparently on
the assumption that the historical process is logical. Thus, there are
numerous statements of the sort: "there can be no doubt that [homicide] was ... the first wrong recognized in primitive society"; 2 s "it is
fair to assume an aboriginal state of non-property"; 29 "it was in the
course of conquest itself that the idea of the state first suggested
itself." so Mr. Seagle's bibliography shows that he is as familiar with
the literature of critical anthropology as anyone, and it is difficult to
account for his employment of such a noncritical method. His practice
of generalizing produces some astonishing results, e.g., "the court was
the first-and perhaps the last-great legal invention"; 111 and his
theory has forced him at times into some extraordinary statements27

SEAGLE, THE
Id. 36.
29 Id. 51.
so Id. 63.
a1 Id. 69.
2s

QuEST FOR

LAw 7 (1941).
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"trade and commerce were of relatively small importance in archaic
societies [ e.g., ancient Egypt and classical Greece! ] ." 82
Against these inexplicable lapses must be set the many sharp insights which distinguish the volume. In his treatment of primitive law,
he courageously returns to the older theory that "Custom is King'' in
spite of the contemporary movement which asserts that the notion of .
"custom" is wholly meaningless. He rejects Malinowski's theory of
reciprocity 38 as the basis of primitive law on the ground that "the
whole trouble with the theory • . . is that not all primitive peoples
regularly exchange fish for vegetables." 84 This criticism is sound
enough if the primitive societies of the world yield to Mr. Seagle's
classificatory scheme. If the primitive societies are grouped in one unit,
then it is clear that reciprocity cannot serve as the basis of primitive law
generally inasmuch as the principle does not function in some societies.
It is also clear that if primitive societies are arranged on a plan different
from Mr. Seagle's, his criticism loses its force. It does not invalidate
the principle as applied to the Trobriand Islanders, the only society tq
which Malinowski purported to apply it. It is Mr. Seagle who is gen. eralizing the principle, not Malinowski. The principle also obtains in
many other communities,85 and, in fact, is so widespread that it has been
suggested that the Maori term utu be used as the general descriptive
label to denote the idea, following the examples of mana and taboo,
words also of Oceanic origin. Mr. Seagle accepts Maine's 86 distinction
between kinship and political society, and sums up the notion in the
phrase "the peace of the kindred"; he suggests there is an analogy
between the idea of the King's Peace and the peace of the kindred.
He thinks that Goebel's 87 complete rejection of the peace concept "is
to write legal history in purely technical terms" and that "when the
special place protected by the king's presence has been conceived as the
whole realm, the king's peace has become the basis of public justice." 89
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He argues that in the early stages the substantive law predominates
over rules of procedure, a view which is almost precisely the opposite
of that which is held generally; and his remarks on the judicial duel
deserve careful attention. He proposes the "juristic person" as the
atom of juristic science, a suggestion which on the surface has much to
recommend it, but which on analysis may turn out to be too sophisticated
to be extended to some primitive societies.
One of the most valuable features of the book is the attention devoted to the effect of writing upon the growth of legal institutions. It
is doubtful if any other legal history has so much to say about the relationship between law and the written word. Mr. Seagle rejects writing as the test of "primitive" law, but it dominates his discussion of
"archaic'' law. He attaches great importance to his contrast between
the "archaic" and "mature" codes. Other writers have called attention
to the incompleteness of the "archaic" code, but Mr. Seagle has made
this incompleteness a test of the distinction between that code and the
"mature" one. He endeavors to develop this distinction further by a
discussion of their political and social bases. He regards the "archaic''
code as reformatory and the "mature" code primarily as a work of
juristic art. His account of professionalism in Roman law, and his
thorough criticism of the efforts to locate the characteristics of a legal
system in its "spirit," are especially noteworthy. When Mr. Seagle
comes to the "maturity" of law, the soundness of his selection of professionalism as the focal point for treatment is particularly apparent.
Here he lays emphasis upon the indifference of the professionals to the
criminal law, and on the contradictions and dilemmas of criminal law
and criminology. His chapter on "The Absolute Reign of Law" represents perhaps the first attempt to explain judicial review from the point
of view of general legal theory, and his defense of international law,
by contrast with the overexaggeration of the merits of municipal law,
has elements of interest. Although the volume is designedly popular,
the jurist should be under no misapprehension that he can learn nothing
from it.

